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98TH CONGRESS
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SENATE

REPORT
No. 98-277

NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS

OCTOBER 24, 1983.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. PERCY, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the following

REPORT

together with

MINORITY AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS

[To accompany S.J. Res. 185]

The Committee on Foreign Relations having had under consideration an original joint resolution with respect to nuclear arms reductions, reports unfavorably thereon.

PURPOSE OF THE RESOLUTION

The purpose of the joint resolution is to express the sense of the Congress with respect to the objectives of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and the negotiations of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF), and other arms control matters. The resolution urges the President to coordinate closely with the Congress in formulating a Mutual Guaranteed Builddown proposal which would immediately cap and then significantly reduce the number of U.S. and Soviet stategic nuclear warheads and their overall destructive capacity. It also recommends steps to ensure Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty, the unratified SALT II Treaty, and the unratified treaties on nuclear testing. Lastly, the resolution would establish as an ultimate goal the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the earth.

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COMMITTEE ACTION

The following resolutions were referred to the Foreign Relations Committee and were considered and consolidated into an original joint resolution:

S.J. Res. 12—Relative to arms control negotiations;

S.J. Res. 29—To prevent nuclear testing;

S.J. Res. 74—To express the sense of the Congress that the United States should promote the goal of strategic stability and reduce the risk of nuclear war through a balanced program of force modernization together with negotiations to achieve substantial, verifiable, and militarily significant reductions to equal levels in the nuclear arsenals of both superpowers.

S. Con. Res. 46—Expressing the sense of the Congress regarding negotiations for the reduction and control of nuclear arms.

S. Res. 57—Expressing the sense of the Senate that the Government of the United States and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should adhere to the principle of a mutual guaranteed build-down of nuclear forces;

S. Res. 83—For Strategic Talks on Prevention (S.T.O.P.);

S. Res. 107—Relating to nuclear arms reduction negotiations;

S. Res. 142—To limit multiple warhead ICBM's;

S. Res. 159—Expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States should propose a mutual pause in flight tests of new MIRV'd ICBM's and seek an arms control agreement in the START talks incorporating the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission.

The Committee also considered and voted separately on S.J. Res. 2, calling for a mutual and verifiable freeze and reduction in nuclear weapons. For a review of Committee action on S.J. Res. 2, see the Committee report accompanying this resolution.

The Committee held four days of hearings on these ten resolutions, as follows:

June 21, 1983—Congressional witnesses (Senators Cohen, Nunn, Hatfield, Kennedy, Levin, Garn, Dole, Specter, and Hart and Congressmen Markey and Leach).

June 22, 1983—Former Directors of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Messrs. Smith, Warnke, Seignious and Rostow) and other public witnesses (Randall Kehler, Susan Catania, Harold Willens, Terry Herndon, Noel Gaylor, William Colby, and Irwin Redlander).

June 23, 1983—Administration witness (Deputy Secretary of State Dam).

September 14, 1983—Administration witness (Executive Session—Top Secret, with Admiral Howe, Department of State).

On August 2, 1983, the Committee met in accordance with Senate Rule 26, which provides that a special meeting of the Committee shall be held upon the written request of a majority of the Members of the Committee. Such a request was made in writing on July 27 by Senators Pressler, Pell, Biden, Glenn, Sarbanes, Zorinsky, Tsongas, Cranston and Dodd. During the meeting Senator Cranston made a motion that the Committee vote on S.J. Res. 2

without amendment at a time certain that morning. Senator Helms objected to voting at the time certain, and the Chairman ruled that under Senate rules a motion to vote at a time certain required unanimous consent, thereby denying the motion. A Cranston appeal of the ruling of the Chairman was defeated on a vote on 9–8. Accordingly, the Committee did not complete action at this meeting on S.J. Res. 2 or any of the other arms control resolutions under consideration.

On September 20, the Committee met for the purpose of marking-up S.J. Res. 2, S.J. Res. 12, S.J. Res. 29, S.J. Res. 74, S. Con. Res. 46, S. Res. 57, S. Res. 83, S. Res. 107, S. Res. 142, and S. Res. 159. During the mark-up, the following record votes were taken on the original joint resolution, which was introduced by Senators Percy, Pressler and Boschwitz as a complete substitute for all of the above resolutions except S.J. Res. 2:

A Pressler amendment, which would have replaced Section 1, paragraph (1) of the resolution with a new provision calling upon the U.S. and Soviet Union to negotiate arms control agreements which would provide for deep and mutual reductions to equitable and balanced force levels, adhere to the principle of a strategic build-down, freeze these forces at lower levels, and include on-site inspection where necessary, was defeated by a vote of 10–6. Those voting in favor of the amendment were Senators Percy, Baker, Mathias, Boschwitz, Pressler and Murkowski. Those voting nay were Senators Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Pell, Biden, Glenn, Sarbanes, Tsongas, Cranston and Dodd.

A Murkowski amendment, declaring that any agreement reached at the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations should not come at the expense of the security of our East Asian allies, was adopted on a voice vote.

A Mathias amendment proposing a mutual and verifiable moratorium on the further deployment of nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) as a means for advancing the goal of achieving a START agreement that would provide for the elimination of all such weapons, was defeated on a vote on 10–7. Those voting in favor of the amendment were Senators Mathias, Pressler, Pell, Biden, Sarbanes, Tsongas, and Cranston. Those voting nay were Senators Percy, Baker, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Murkowski, Glenn, Zorinsky, and Dodd.

A Pressler amendment, amending Section 5, paragraph (1) of the resolution to express the sense of the Senate that the President should request Senate consent to ratification of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties (TTBT/PNE) provided the Administration makes a best effort to gain Soviet agreement to the establishment of a consultative mechanism for the TTBT comparable to that provided for in the PNE treaty, was approved on a voice vote.

A Pell amendment, which would have deleted Section 2 from the resolution, failed on a tie vote (7–7). Those Senators voting in favor of the amendment were Senators Mathias, Pell, Glenn, Sarbanes, Tsongas, Cranston, and Dodd. Those voting nay were Senators Percy, Baker, Lugar, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, and Murkowski. Senator Helms voted "present."

A Helms amendment, which replaced Section 5, as amended by the Pressler amendment, with new language expressing the sense of the Congress that the United States should negotiate procedures to assure Soviet compliance with the TTBT, was approved by a vote of 8–6. Those Senators voting in favor of the amendment were Senators Percy, Baker, Helms, Lugar, Mathias, Boschwitz, Pressler, and Murkowski. Those voting nay were Senators Kassebaum, Pell, Glenn, Tsongas, Cranston, and Dodd.

A Percy motion to report the Percy/Pressler/Boschwitz resolution, as amended with a favorable recommendation failed on a tie vote (6–6). Those Senators present and voting in favor of the motion were Senators Percy, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Pressler and Murkowski. Those present and voting nay were Senators Mathias, Pell, Glenn, Sarbanes, Cranston, and Dodd. Senators Baker and Boschwitz voted aye by proxy. Senators Biden and Tsongas voted nay by proxy.

A motion by Senator Mathias to report the original joint resolution and S.J. Res. 2, both without recommendation, failed on a tie vote (7–7). Those present and voting in favor of the motion were Senators Mathias, Pell, Glenn, Sarbanes, Tsongas, Cranston, and Dodd. Those present and voting nay were Senators Percy, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, and Murkowski. Senators Biden and Zorinsky voted aye by proxy. Senator Baker voted nay by proxy.

A Cranston motion to report the original joint resolution and S.J. Res. 2, both with an unfavorable recommendation, passed on a 10–4 vote. Those voting aye were Senators Percy, Mathias, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pell, Glenn, Sarbanes, Tsongas, Cranston, and Dodd. Those voting nay were Senators Helms, Lugar, Pressler, and Murkowski.

COMMITTEE COMMENTS

The build-down concept was put before the Congress on February 19 in S. Res. 57, which set forth the idea of a guaranteed strategic build-down of strategic forces, subject to agreed procedures on verification and compliance. At the time, the concept was explained as calling for the retirement of two ballistic missile warheads for every new one deployed. To meet criticisms, the ratios proposed have been made more flexibile, and, last month, the proposal was expanded to be a "double build-down" of both missile warheads and in "overall destructive capacity", under some agreed fashion of each sides nuclear forces.

These modifications were not put before the Committee formally for its consideration. Unfortunately, the Administration did not provide any judgments on build-down prior to markup. Its sponsors had intended that the builddown proposal be incorporated into the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in the round beginning in October, but, as of markup, the Administration was still struggling with its decision. This performance was particularly regrettable in the aftermath of Chairman Percy's decision to call upon the Committee at the August markup to delay its decision until after an anticipated August 20 deadline for an Administration response.

A month after that deadline, the Administration still had not responded.

Accordingly, the Percy/Pressler/Boschwitz resolution was drafted to commend the President for endorsing the concept and to urge him to coordinate with the Congress in formulating a specific proposal.

Specifics on build-down were omitted.

Subsequently, on October 4, the President announced that the build-down concept would be incorporated into the U.S. position at the START negotiations. According to the President, the proposal will call for a guaranteed annual build-down in missile warheads of about 5 percent and reductions under variable ratios of existing warheads as new ones are deployed. According to press reports, the deployment of each new warhead on a MIRVed ICBM would require the retirement of two ballistic missile warheads. The ratio would be three warheads retired for every two deployed in the case of MIRVed submarine-launched ballistic missiles and one for one in the case of new warheads on single-warhead missiles, according to reports. The rule producing the greater reductions would govern, according to the President. There was no indication whether a precursor agreement would be sought or whether a build-down agreement would only come about in the context of an overall START agreement.

It would have been helpful for the Committee to have details on the Administration's approach to build-down. However, the Committee was familiar with the concept and its evolution and was thus fully able to judge the build-down concept on its merits. The subsequent Administration decision on build-down affected the details, not the concept.

The build-down failed to win the support of a majority of Committee Members. It was clear that several major concerns underlaid that decision:

First, the build-down concept, if put into practice, appears to be simply too open to continued nuclear weapons development, testing, production and deployment. Rather than stopping massive nuclear arms programs, it could well encourage them. By institutionalizing a system of nuclear weapons modernization, build-down could help guarantee a qualitative arms race well into the next century.

Clearly, modernization by one side would be watched closely by the other. If build-down encouraged widescale revamping of strategic forces, the potential for an arms race would increase. Since build-down would allow the deployment of more accurate, more powerful and more sophisticated weapons, both sides might fear being left behind. It is legitimate to question whether build-down might indeed encourage, rather than discourage, spending on strategic arms, with the prospects that the side spending the most might achieve some strategic advantage.

Second, build-down could force changes inour strategic arsenal detrimental to our national security.

Such an outcome would be possible if a reduction formula were adopted and applied which forced cuts in stabilizing systems as a price for new deployment. For example, as build-down has been presented, it is envisaged that two ballistic missile warheads would

be retired for each new warhead on a MIRVed ICBM. This would mean that the deployment of 100 MX missiles with 1,000 warheads would require the retirement of 2,000 ballistic missile warheads. That is close to the 2,145 warheads on our existing ICBM force. Thus, it would appear that both land-based and submarine-based warheads would have to be retired to save a significant part of the existing ICBM force. Congress would have to weigh carefully, under such circumstances, whether the price of cutting into our stable deterrent force in order to have MX was outrageously high. A choice to reduce MX deployment could mitigate the problem, but raise the question whether very low levels of MX deployments made any strategic or financial sense. A question whether to deploy MX at all would have to be raised anew if build-down were implemented.

Third, build-down appears to be based on the assumption that strategic planners will exercise the right options to move the sides to more survivable systems, thus stabilizing the arms race. Unfortunately, there is nothing in build-down to guarantee that force changes would be in the direction of stability. As we have seen with MX, newer weapons systems are not necessarily more stable than the systems they replace. The MX and the Soviet SS–24 show that the choices are not always toward greater stability. It is important to understand that under build-down, destabilizing choices can still be made. The only difference is that, in some cases, a price would be exacted, but no prohibition would be imposed.

We do not question the sincerity of many build-down supporters in their desire for stability. However, most strategic analysts would agree that reductions do not necessarily promote stability if the resulting mix of weapons undermines strategic deterrence. It is quite possible to envisage forces with 5,000 ballistic missile warheads per side—including new more powerful and more accurate warheads—which would be less stable than the present total of about 7,500 per side. If build-down were not all-encompassing, it is possible to foresee increases in one type of system, such as cruise missiles, which would leave the two sides with more warheads than at present despite reductions. The outcome would depend largely upon the decisions made by the two superpowers, either by choice or because of obligations under agreement.

Fourth, build-down does nothing to meet the desires of those who would halt the arms race and reduce our arsenals in order to lessen the threat of nuclear war. A number of Members of the Committee support the approach embodied in the nuclear freeze and reductions resolution, S.J. Res. 2. The freeze would stop the arms race and serve as a prelude to genuine reductions, which would be pursued assiduously. Thus, the freeze would deal effectively with the problems posed by both the quantitative and the qualitative arms race. Build-down would do nothing to stop the qualitative arms race and it would only deal with the quantitative arms race in a convoluted and uncertain fashion.

Finally, the question of build-down's negotiability must be raised. There has been scant progress to date in START. We should be very wary of any approach which might reduce, rather than enhance, prospects for a solid, productive agreement.

Having made these points, it should be understood that many of us believe that build-down might be of value in charting a course for reductions, once the arms race is halted. At that point, build-down or other formulas might be helpful in achieving agreement, so long as any formulation assured that only the modernization necessary to ensure stability is permitted. In such a fashion, both the freeze and build-down might strengthen our security, so long as build-down was not a substitute for an effective way to stop the arms race and reduce nuclear arsenals.

Other aspects of resolution

The Committee also considered carefully other sections relating to objectives in START and INF, calling for continued restraint from actions which would undercut SALT I and II, calling upon the Soviets to observe encryption constraints and expressing full support for Administration efforts to gain detailed infomation from the Soviets on SALT compliance.

In an instance of a step backward, the Committee dropped paragraphs urging the President to seek Senate consent to ratification of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Expolosions Treaties and calling for negotitions on a comprehensive test ban. A similar call won strong approval last year and merited similar support this year.

Unfortunately, the resolution represents more a business-as-usual approach to the arms race than a comprehensive plan. The overall effect is to endorse and commend the status quo. There is no sense in the resolution that there are any real and pressing problems in arms control, other than those for which the Soviets are responsible.

Given the questions raised and not resolved in the resolution, its omissions and the lack of any compelling case for the resolution, the Committee concluded that rejection was the proper course and ordered the resolution reported unfavorably by a 10-4 vote.

COST ESTIMATE

In accordance with Rule XXVI, paragraph 11(a) of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that there will be no budgetary impact from the passage of this Resolution. The following estimate was provided by the Congressional Budget Office:

U.S. CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
Washington, D.C., September 30, 1983.

Hon. CHARLES H. PERCY,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to Section 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Congressional Budget Office has reviewed the Senate joint resolution with respect to nuclear arms reductions (S.J. Res. 185) as ordered reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on September 20, 1983.

The passage of this resolution will not mandate any changes to military procurement or operations. Accordingly, it is expected

that no additional cost to the government would be incurred as a result of enactment of this legislation. In addition, passage of this resolution would have no impact on costs for state and local governments.

Should the Committee so desire, we would be pleased to provide further detail on this cost estimate.

Sincerely,

RUDOLPH G. PENNER,
Director.

REGULATORY IMPACT AND CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

In accordance with Rule XXVI, paragraphs 11(b) and 12 of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee concludes that there will be no regulatory impact from the passage of this joint resolution. There will also be no repeal or amendment of existing law.

MINORITY VIEWS OF MESSRS. PERCY, LUGAR, BOSCHWITZ, PRESSLER, AND MURKOWSKI

We support the original joint resolution offered by Senators Percy, Pressler and Boschwitz because is prescribes a prudent and practical approach for pursuing a broad range of priority U.S. arms control objectives. As stated by the Administration, the resolution is "consistent with the thrust of U.S. arms control policies and objectives." At the same time, the resolution expresses support for important arms control initiatives that have originated within the Senate, in particular, the Mutual Guaranteed Build-down proposal.

START

In Section 1, the resolution affirms the view of the Congress that the objective of the START negotiations should be to achieve significant reductions in each side's strategic inventory as a first priority. The emphasis in this section on reductions contrasts with the approach recommended by the nuclear freeze proposal, which would defer negotiations on real reductions until after lengthy negotiations were completed on a freeze. The resolution fully supports the position taken by the U.S. in START calling for significant reductions to equal levels in the aggregate number of ICBMs and the SLBMs and the aggregate number of warheads deployed on these systems, with comparable reductions in other types of strategic offensive systems.

We believe that the President is to be commended for his recent initiatives in presenting the Soviet Union with revised and more flexible U.S. START proposals. Although the Soviets have recently dropped some of their unrealistic demands, we believe the Soviets' START proposal remains unacceptable and must be further modified if notable progress is to be made in concluding a mutually acceptable treaty. The U.S. should of course be prepared to respond flexibly to any constructive Soviet proposal, with good-faith bargaining by each side aimed at achieving an acceptable agreement at the earliest practical time.

Section 1 also reaffirms the central premise of the Scowcroft Commission report, i.e., that if a more stable and secure nuclear balance is to be established with the Soviet Union, both sides must transition from highly MIRVed ICBMs, such as the MX and its Soviet counterparts, toward missiles which are individually less attractive as targets. The resolution declares that an ultimate goal of the START negotiations should be the elimination of all MIRVed ICBMs.

BUILD-DOWN

On October 4, President Reagan announced that he had instructed the U.S. START delegation to propose a number of new initia-

tives in START, specifically including a proposal for a Mutal Guaranteed Build-down designed to encourage stabilizing systems. This decision, taken two weeks after the Committee mark-up on this resolution, fully implements the spirit and letter of Section 2 of the resolution, which commended the President for endorsing the build-down concept and called on him to coordinate closely with the Congress in formulating a specific build-down proposal that could be presented to the Soviets at the October/November 1983 START negotiating round.

As outlined by the White House, the build-down proposal will include:

A provision which links reductions to modernization using variable ratios which identify how many existing nuclear warheads must be withdrawn as new warheads of various types are deployed;

A provision calling for guaranteed annual percentage build-down (an approximately 5 percent mandatory build-down per year);

A provision that ensures that the reductions would be paced by whichever above rule produces the greatest reductions.

In addition, the U.S. delegation will be prepared to:

Address concurrently the build-down of bombers;

Discuss additional limitations on the air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) carried by U.S. bombers;

Negotiate trade-offs, taking into account Soviet advantages in missiles and U.S. advantages in bombers, in ways that provide each side maximum flexibility consistent with movement towards a more stable balance of forces;

Propose the establishment of a working group in START to discuss the U.S. build-down initiative in Round V.

The effect of the new build-down proposal, if accepted by the Soviets, would be to place an immediate cap on each side's missile warheads and bombers and on the overall destructive capacity of these systems. The build-down does not require new systems to be deployed nor is it dependent on new deployments to achieve reductions. Indeed, even if no deployments take place each side must at a minimum reduce their strategic weapons by 5 percent per year. In those cases where valid modernization requirements prompt either side to deploy new systems, they must dismantle existing weapons at about a two-to-one ratio. The immediate objective is to achieve a one-third reduction both in current levels of weaponry and in their overall destructive capacity, while permitting modernization programs that promote stability or enhance deterrence to go forward.

Some observers have expressed concern that under the build-down each side could add powerful and more deadly new weapons while only having to take out obsolete and less effective weapons. This is simply not the case. First, the build-down in its final form includes a restriction on overall destructive capacity. By the terms of the build-down itself, neither side can increase the destructive capacity (i.e., deadliness) of its strategic forces. For example, for each new "unit" of nuclear destructiveness added, two "units" of existing nuclear destructiveness could be taken out. In addition, the final build-down proposal establishes definite disincentives for

going forward with large-scale deployments of the most destructive and deadly kinds of weapons, such as MIRVed ICBMs. The build-down plan in effect offers strategic planners a choice: if they deploy multiple-warhead ICBMs (which we all agree leads to great instability), they will have to dismantle far more warheads than if they turn to more stabilizing systems, such as bombers, single-warhead ICBMs, or sea-launched ballistic missiles.

We believe that the build-down proposal outlined by the President, coupled with the other changes in our START negotiating position, warrant the full, bi-partisan support of the Congress. The principal congressional sponsors of the build-down concept, including Senators Cohen, Nunn, Percy and Pressler, have all announced their strong support for this specific proposal, which resulted from several months of consultation between the Administration and the Congress. Moreover, the new U.S. START proposal, including the initiative on build-down, has been praised by a number of leading strategic experts in the House, including Representatives Aspin, Gore and Dicks, who were also deeply involved in the consultations.

In our opinion, the new U.S. START proposal represents a historic occasion. It is the first time that a major arms control proposal has ever been worked out jointly between the Executive and the Legislative branches. The Soviet Union would be wise to recognize that the President and the Congress are united as never before behind President Reagan's arms control and strategic modernization policies. The President has again demonstrated that he is willing to go the extra mile to ensure that our arms control negotiating position is reasonable and flexible. In START, as in INF, he has opened the door for a mutually acceptable accord. As the Los Angeles Times said in an October 5 editorial, "It is now up to the Kremlin either to accept the U.S. proposal or come up with something better."

We regret that the Administration was not able to complete its preparation of the build-down prior to the Committee vote on the resolution. Had this happened, we believe that the resolution would have garnered more support and been passed by a strong majority. We recognize, though, that final Administration decision-making on the build-down was delayed by two developments: (1) the Scowcroft Commission was asked at a late date to propose new recommendations on modifying the U.S. START Proposal, and the Commission needed time to review fully the build-down concept; and (2) on September 9, Senators Cohen, Nunn and Percy unveiled a significant refinement in the original build-down proposal, one intended to broaden the concept to include qualitative considerations, such as overall destructive capacity. The Administration required some time to assess the new "double build-down" proposal before agreeing, as they did, to incorporate this feature into the final build-down package.

SALT RESTRAINT POLICY

Section 3 indicates the support of the Congress for the President's May 1982 announcement that the U.S. would continue to avoid actions that would undercut the SALT I and SALT II agree-

ments as long as the Soviets show equal restraint. We would stress, though, that compliance with this informal restraint regime must be reciprocal. In this regard, we are concerned by reports that the Soviets have been encrypting missile test data to such a degree that the U.S. ability to use national technical means to verify Soviet compliance with these agreements has been impeded. We are also alarmed by reports that the Soviets may be developing a second "new type" ICBM in contravention of the provisions of SALT II and that they are constructing a new radar in central Siberia that may contravene the ABM Treaty. We fully support the efforts of the Administration to attain a detailed description by the Soviet Union of the pertinent characteristics of its new PL-5 ICBM and the function and capabilities of the new Soviet radar at Abalakova.

INF

We fully support the President's efforts to negotiate an INF agreement that provides for a stable and equal balance of U.S. and Soviet INF systems at the lowest possible level. We commend the President for showing flexibility in his approach to these negotiations, as underscored by his announcement of a new "interim" INF proposal in March and the recent modifications which he announced in his speech to the United Nations on September 26. We regard the Soviet Union's current INF proposal as unacceptable and believe it must be further modified if progress is to be made toward concluding a mutually acceptable accord. Should the Soviet Union demonstrate genuine flexibility in its approach to these negotiations, the U.S. should be willing to continue bargaining in good-faith, with an eye towards achieving a final, acceptable treaty at the earliest practical time. It is our firm belief, though, that any agreement reached in INF should not come at the expense of the security of our allies in the Far East. In particular, we would disapprove of any INF accord that permitted an increase in the level of Soviet INF systems deployed in Asia or that permitted the redeployment from Europe to Asia of Soviet INF systems that must be reduced under the terms of an eventual INF treaty.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Section 5 of the resolution expresses the sense of the Congress that the U.S. seek to negotiate procedures with the Soviet Union that would enable us to verify whether the Soviets were complying with the threshold limitations established in the TTBT. The Administration has taken the position that it is prepared to request the advice and consent of the Senate on the TTBT and PNE treaties provided the Soviets agree to new verification measures that will allow us to maintain greater confidence in their compliance with the provisions of these accords. To date, the Soviets have rejected repeated U.S. demarches proposing such discussions and have insisted that the treaties be ratified before they will discuss enhanced verification. Some Members of the Committee have noted that the treaties contain verification provisions that have not been implemented because the treaties have never been ratified. These Members contend that the U.S. should put the treaties into force,

implement the verification provisions, and then decide whether additional measures are needed. As amended by the language proposed by Senator Helms, Section 5 is silent on the question of whether the successful attainment of new, negotiated verification procedures should or should not be a precondition to the ratification of these treaties.

ULTIMATE ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES

Section 2 of the 1951 Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended declares that "an ultimate goal of the United States is a world which is free from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments." In creating the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the act directs ACDA to "deal with the problem of reduction and control of armaments looking toward ultimate world disarmament."

Section 6 of the joint resolution, which is identical to a paragraph in last year's Committee resolution (S.J. Res. 212), reaffirms this ultimate goal of U.S. arms control policy. Its inclusion in the joint resolution is intended to express the Committee's commitment to a dynamic and continuing arms reduction process, one which carries beyond the initial efforts to bring the arms race under some control and leads eventually to the elimination of all nuclear weapons in the world.

This section also underscores the crucial linkage between the U.S. commitment to continuing nuclear arms reductions and our efforts to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons states. Only if the rest of the world is convinced that the United States and the Soviet Union are dedicated to reducing, and eventually eliminating their inventories of nuclear weapons will non-nuclear States forego acquiring similar capabilities.

CHARLES H. PERCY.
RICHARD G. LUGAR.
RUDY BOSCHWITZ.
LARRY PRESSLER.
FRANK H. MURKOWSKI.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. MATHIAS

The lack of consensus within the Foreign Relations Committee about what course of arms control to pursue, be it the Nuclear Weapons Freeze, the "Double Build Down", or more specific incremental measures, reflects the paralyzing absence of a more basic consensus on national security policy within the United States government.

Our first priority must be to develop a bipartisan strategy for defense planning and the conduct of foreign policy. An integral element of that strategy must be agreement on our approach to arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Few would deny that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can derive any advantage out of a situation of nuclear weapons instability. The best way of preventing such instability is by maintaining an effective strategic deterrent in the face of an increasingly powerful and versatile adversary. One of the difficulties in freezing all nuclear weapons systems at one time is that certain stabilizing forms of modernization would actually be prevented. A freeze on the development of all delivery systems would preclude the introduction into our force structure of the Stealth Bomber, additional Trident submarines and, at some later point, a mobile single-warhead ICBM like Midgetman.

We need to work on those measures that will increase mutual confidence and promote nuclear stability. I am reminded of Sir Winston Churchill's dictum that not all things must be settled in order to settle some things. As a first step, we must resume Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations. We are obligated, as are the Soviets, by the terms of the Limited Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Treaties to pursue actively a complete halt to nuclear testing.

A sensible next step would be to ratify the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. These treaties were negotiated, signed and submitted to the Senate in 1974 and 1976, respectively, by Presidents Nixon and Ford. Taken together, these accords establish a comprehensive system of regulations to govern the underground nuclear explosions of the United States and the Soviet Union in a manner consistent with enhanced stability.

Other arms control initiatives demand our immediate attention. We ought to agree with the Soviet Union on limitations on the deployment of Sea-launched cruise missiles, even though the United States has an apparent technological lead in this area. We ought to be doing this right now, in the START talks, before major SLCM deployments make future arms control agreements a practical impossibility.

We must address the problem of militarizing outer space. Certain outer space activity has contributed to arms control; satellites have created new and highly reliable verification procedures. But this

positive aspect is threatened by a space technology that is rapidly providing the ability to destroy these national technical means of verification. If we act now, the devastatingly expensive and lethal programs for the militarization of outer space could die a relatively clean, uncomplicated death. If we and the U.S.S.R. delay, we will be faced with an environment increasingly difficult to control and hostile to human beings a few hundred miles below.

Additional arms control measures which must be explored with the Soviet Union include a flight test ban on new MIRVed ICBM's, and a reappraisal of the effectiveness and necessity of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Western Europe.

It is still not clear whether the Reagan Administration understands the distinction between arms reductions and arms control. I have been encouraged recently by the President's support for a wide range of confidence-building measures, chiefly improvements in the Hotline; a Joint Military Communications Link with the Soviet Union, and advance notification of U.S. and Soviet ICBM, SLBM, and INF missile tests. But such steps, as well as most of the other measures I've mentioned, do not involve reductions at all, and yet represent enormous steps forward in managing the superpower nuclear relationship. We must strike a balance between the long-term goal of reductions and the immediate need for arms control.

I have deliberately avoided "packaging" these various initiatives in any all-encompassing, comprehensive fashion. I prefer instead to engage the Soviet Union in a number of ongoing negotiations: freezing some systems, reducing others, and preventing other programs from ever beginning. One must choose those areas where success seems most likely or control is most urgent and actively pursue agreement, confident that one success will beget still another, certain that such confidence is a cumulative thing.

Only by addressing our principal adversary with one voice, and with a message that extends beyond any one Administration, can we hope to control and reduce the nuclear menace it poses to the world.

CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MRS. KASSEBAUM

It was unfortunate, but understandable, that the Foreign Relations Committee was unable to have a majority of its members in favor of either of the major proposals before it. I believe that the inability to do so was the result of two factors: the increased tensions in the Soviet-American relationship caused by the destruction of Korean Air Lines flight 007 and the fact that the Administration's INF and START negotiation positions were clearly in a state of flux at the time of our mark up.

The tensions resulting from the KAL 007 disaster unavoidably have affected the attitudes even of those Americans who most fervently seek an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. That was true even though the Administration has properly, I believe, not make any direct linkage between the KAL tragedy and arms control negotiations.

Also complicating our deliberations was the fact that the Administration was in the midst of modifying its INF negotiating position and of considering the implications of a modified formulation of the "build-down" proposal. This situation created uncertainty about the wisdom of amendments to the resolution being considered by the Committee.

Because of these events outside of the Committee's markup, a consensus in favor of either the freeze or the Percy resolution was clearly impossible. Accordingly, I announced my decision to vote against all amendments to either freeze—or the Percy resolutions—during mark up. This decision was made most reluctantly, expecially in the case of Senator Mathias' SLCM amendment to the Percy resolution. I am a cosponsor and continue to be a supporter of Senator Mathias' initiative. However, to amend such a constructive proposal to a vehicle which had no majority support, in may judgment, was a futile exercise.

For the same reason, I did not offer a proposal by Senator Levin, myself, and ten other cosponsors to call for a halt in the flight testing of the MX missiles as soon as, and for as long as, the Soviet Union reciprocates with a half in the flight testing of its new MIRVed ICBMS. I continue to be a strong supporter and coauthor of that proposal and fully intend to offer it for Senate consideration during floor debate. I strongly believe that the proposal for a mutual ICBM flight test pause meets the various arms control criteria of the Administration, the freeze and the build-down. For that reason, I hope that it will receive broad Senate support.

I voted in favor of Senator Cranston's motion to report to the Senate both the freeze and the Percy resolution in disagreement. To vote either resolution, or both, with no recommendation to the Senate would have been inconsistent with the fact that a majority of the Committee opposed the Senator's adoption of either resolu-

tion. To have voted any other way, I believe, would not have reflected to the Senate the true sentiment of the Committee.

With respect to the proposal for a nuclear freeze, I find it most troubling that many of the advocates of the freeze support one mothod of arms control to the exclusion of all others. This is especially troubling when the freeze would require the cessation of ongoing negotiations for a sizeable reduction merely to achieve a freeze before reductions can be discussed. For that reason, I have opposed, and will continue to oppose, the nuclear freeze proposal. However, I find it equally disturbing that some of those opposed to the freeze have chosen to question the discretion, and even patriotism, of the supporters of the freeze. To do so, divides the nation on the all-important question of arms control when unity is needed and could be achieved in a less acrimonious atmosphere.

I strongly hope that the full Senate will be able to debate the arms control issue at a time when external circumstances will allow a serious and objective debate and the formulation of a national consensus on an issue that heretofore has divided us.

NANCY LANDON KASSEBAUM.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. HELMS

Although I supported the resolution offered in the Committee by the distinguished Chairman, I did so only in terms of the over-all consensus which developed in the Committee against the so-called nuclear weapons freeze resolution. In particular, I was encouraged by the Committee's action in rejecting an immediate consideration of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty in favor of further negotiations on that issue to ensure Soviet compliance. The 8–6 vote on that issue in Committee was an important step forward in getting real arms control.

Although the resolution did not, strictly speaking, endorse any specific build-down proposal, I have many reservations about the build-down concept. Indeed, I cannot accept any such proposal that I have seen. The build-down concept itself is a unilateral concession that undermines the arms control process.

Instead of focusing on preemptive concessions in efforts to outbid pacifist and leftist movement in Europe and at home, the United States should be focusing upon ensuring Soviet compliance with existing arms control treaties. Such an action would be a real confidence-building measure, and would lead to effective verification procedures to ensure Soviet compliance with future treaties.

Moreover, there are sound strategic, historical, and technical reasons which oppose build-down, which are outlined in detail in these additional views. Fundamentally, the United States must insist on equality in any future arms control treaty, rather than on any preset ratio which reduces levels but preserves the relative imbalance. We do not want a build-down which preserves U.S. inferiority. The build-down penalizes U.S. strategic modernization at a time when the U.S. is way behind the Soviets in modernization. It also undercuts completely President Reagan's strategic buildup, itself already cut back.

The unratified SALT II Treaty was inequal, unbalanced, destabilizing, and in the words of the Armed Services Committee, a danger to the U.S. national security. The build-down concept appears to accentuate the worst aspects of SALT II. When the U.S. strategic posture is inferior to the Soviet posture, all a build-down arms control treaty can do is to codify this reality.

Nevertheless, there are few issues today of greater public concern regarding the long-range security of the nation than arms control. All want to see the day when effective, verifiable, and substantial reductions can be made in the nuclear weapons held by both superpowers.

But we must ask ourselves, first, what it is that we can hope to achieve? Negotiations and good will cannot repeal the basic laws of human nature, or the stern prescriptions of common sense. We seem unwilling to accept the fundamental reality that history has not yet provided us with evidence that the Soviet Union is willing

to accept meaningful, verifiable arms limitation or reduction. History shows us that the only kind of arms control agreements acceptable to the Soviets in the past are those that:

(1) Grant the Soviet Union military superiority through a combination of provisions that are unequal in the Soviet favor and others that are unequal in effect;

(2) Provide limitations that limit us, but are loopholes as far as Soviet military programs are concerned;

(3) Contain provisions that cannot be verified; or

(4) Contribute to the Soviet goal to be able to fight, win, and survive a nuclear war by eroding the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

To put it in more concrete terms, there has actually been an eight or ninefold increase in the number of Soviet strategic nuclear warheads aimed at the United States since SALT negotiations began in 1969. And since the SALT II treaty was signed in 1979, there has been almost an 80-percent increase in the number of Soviet nuclear warheads aimed at the United States. Soviet modernization has been so rapid that about half of the Soviet missile force was deployed within the last five years, a period that saw almost no U.S. modernization.

The reason for this huge Soviet growth, while the United States had no growth, was that the Soviets view negotiations as an arena of political conflict with the United States. That is why in SALT I, the Soviet Union insisted on more ICBMs and SLBMs than were allowed to the United States, and a monopoly on the largest and most destructive missiles. SALT II carried over most of these unequal provisions (more ICBM's for the Soviets and the Soviet monopoly on heavy missiles) and added some unequal provisions relating to bombers. Most Soviet bombers including the highly capable Backfire were excluded from the limitations while retired U.S. bombers, that could not even fly, were counted. Both SALT I and II adopted the missile launcher as the basic unit of limitation, even though Soviet launchers were capable of launching and refiring larger and more powerful missiles and are now much more resistant to nuclear attack. Much of the difficulty we face in finding a survivable basing mode for the MX missiles is a direct result of limitations placed on U.S. offensive and defense forces in the SALT I and SALT II treaties.

Finally, the harsh reality is that the Soviet Union entered every existing arms control treaty of significance with the intent to violate or evade it. They are continuing to do that and we are continuing to accept such behavior. Indeed, we are increasingly adopting the conceptual basis of the last major Soviet arms control violations as the basis for new arms control proposals. The operative language of the "nuclear freeze" resolutions are virtually identical to the prohibitions of the Biological Weapons Conventions, which the Soviets are clearly violating. The "build-down" proposal is conceptually identical to the so-called "new" ICBM provision of SALT II, which the Soviets are now violating.

We must always be prepared, in our relations with the Soviet Union, to fall back upon another alternative than the assumption that the Soviets are negotiating in good will. The possibility is not unthinkable that they are negotiating in order to get the better of

us. We could get an agreement tomorrow if we adopted the only principles which seem acceptable to the Soviets:

(1) No effective limit on the growth of Soviet forces;
(2) An effective prohibition on improvement of U.S. forces;
(3) No effective verification capabilities;
(4) Formal acceptance of U.S. inequality.

Peter Pan believed that Tinker Bell could be brought back to life if everyone joined hands and wished for us. But in actual life, this Senator believes that it is time we discarded the Tinker Bell theory of negotiations and faced the hard reality.

THE BUILD-DOWN CONCEPT

The build-down concept attempts to reduce strategic forces while at the same time allowing modernization. However, the build-down concept has yet to be precisely defined by its proponents or by the Reagan Administration. Such ratios as one new warhead being allowed if two old warheads are reduced, or two new for three old, etc., are being proposed. There are some proposals focusing on missile launcher and bomber build-downs, not warheads. Thus the build-down concept is still imprecise. But we do have relatively precise modernization definitions and constraints in the SALT II Treaty's Article IV. The Soviets are unfortunately already violating SALT II Article IV. Thus how can a vague build-down be seriously proposed in light of Soviet violation of precise modernization constraints?

Another problem with build-down is that U.S. and Soviet strategic forces are at present grossly unequal. The Soviets have more than 1,000 more missile launchers and bombers than the U.S., carrying more than 1,000 warheads than the U.S. Moreover, about three quarters of Soviet warheads are carried on launchers less than five years old, while in contrast, about three quarters of U.S. warheads are carried on launchers fifteen years older. In addition, most Soviet warheads are on the average ten times more powerful than each U.S. warhead. Thus in addition to the quantitative disparities, there exists qualitative inequalities. The Soviets have already completed their strategic modernization, while U.S. strategic modernization is only just beginning. Thus a build-down or a freeze would preserve existing quantitative and qualitative asymmetries to U.S. disadvantage, while also preserving U.S. strategic vulnerability, thereby weakening deterrence.

I have grave difficulties with the concept of "build-down." The build-down concept attempts to constrain strategic modernization programs on both the U.S. and Soviet sides. However, we have had bad experiences with modernization constraints in SALT I and SALT II. In SALT I, Article II attempted to prevent the Soviets from replacing light ICBMs with modernized heavy ICBMs, yet the Soviets circumvented or violated Article II by deploying the new heavy SS–19 ICBM to replace the old light SS–11 ICBM.

Now in SALT II, we have Article IV, which attempts to define and constrain "new-type" Soviet ICBMs. Yet the Soviets are now flight testing the new SS–X–24 ICBM and the SS–X–25 ICBM. SALT II's Article IV allows the Soviets to have only one "new type" ICBM, yet they have two. The SS–X–25, previously called the

PL-5 or Plesetsk Range 5, is officially a second new type ICBM, and therefore it is clearly a Soviet violation of the main modernization constraint provisicn of SALT II.

Given this bad experience with Soviet circumvention or violation of the main modernization constraints of both SALT I and SALT II, I believe that the build-down concept is both unwise and unworkable. I therefore oppose the build-down concept, because it would work to U.S. disadvantage and is already being violated by the Soviets.

Moreover, a "build-down" has been underway on the U.S. side for the last twenty years. As Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle has stated in regard to this period:

"It's been roughly a two-for-one build-down . . ."

That is, two U.S. warheads were eliminated on the average for every new one deployed.

The last fourteen years of SALT I and SALT II negotiations provide an especially good illustration of this unilateral U.S. build-down. Since 1969, when SALT I negotiations began, the U.S. has unilaterally deactivated or cancelled 710 strategic delivery vehicles carrying over 6,000 nuclear warheads which were either deployed or planned for deployment. During this same period, the Soviets have constructed over 1,000 new missile launchers, and built over 250 Backfire bombers, carrying over 6,000 nuclear warheads. The attached chart illustrates this U.S. build-down.

THE TOTAL WEAPONS IN U.S. STOCKPILE



THE CURVE IS DISCONTINUOUS BECAUSE THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF WEAPONS IN THE STOCKPILE AT ANY TIME BEYOND 1948, IS CLASSIFIED.

This chart shows that the total number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile has declined significantly since 1965. This chart shows that in fact there has been massive U.S. unilateral restraint since 1965, and that there has in fact been no arms race on the U.S. side. Indeed, the U.S. has been going backward, while the Soviets have been going forward. A comparable Soviet line on the chart would rise upward from 1965 to the present.

In addition, this chart does not show several other important facts. First, the explosive power of megatonnage of U.S. nuclear warheads has also declined significantly over the same period. Thus the U.S. has less explosive power.

Second, the accuracy of U.S. weapons has increased over time, thus ensuring that there would be less "collateral damage" to civilian targets should the U.S. warheads ever be fired.

Third, the command and control and safety U.S. warheads has increased dramatically since 1965, thus insuring that the U.S. President's control over the weapons is enhanced and the likelihood of unauthorized use or nuclear accident is reduced.

In more specific terms, the U.S. has consistently deactivated its nuclear systems unilaterally. In comparison with the Soviet buildup, the U.S. build-down looks like this:

A. Comparison of U.S.-Soviet strategic force postures over 20 years: Unilateral restraint versus steady buildup

	Soviet buildup
1963:	
U.S. unilateral deactivation of 100 Thor and Jupiter IRBMs deployed to Europe	Soviets keep 500 SS–4/5s, add 300 SS–20s
U.S. unilateral deactivation of 100 Shark GLCMs	Soviets keep 250 SLCMs
U.S. unilateral deactivation of about 2000 B–47 bombers	Soviets keep 700 Badgers
U.S. unilateral deactivation of 185 Atlas and Titan ICBMs	Soviets keep 210 SS–7/8s until 1976, use as SALT I bargaining chip
U.S. unilateral cutback of 200 Titan II ICBMs	
U.S. unilateral cutback of 300 to 1,000 Minuteman ICBMs	Soviets accelerate SS–11/9 deployment in 1963, surpass U.S. ICBM total in 1969
U.S. unilateral cancellation of B–70 bomber and Skybolt ASMs	
U.S. unilateral reduction in air defense missiles and interceptors	Soviets keep 10,000 SAMs, 5,000 interceptors, modernize both
U.S. unilateral cutback in Polaris submarine deployment from 44 to 41 submarines	Soviet build over 62 SSBNs
Decision to freeze ICBM and SLBM deployment in 1967	Soviets keep adding new ICBM launchers, new SLBM launcher continue. Soviets add 1,000 new ICBM and SLBM launchers in 1969–77 period, after achieving parity in 1969
1964:	
U.S. unilateral arms control reduction of U.S. enriched uranium and plutonium production	Soviets increase nuclear weapon plant capacity and production
1967:	
U.S. unilateral deactivation of 70 B–58 bombers	Soviets keep 100 Blinders
U.S. unilateral freeze in ICBM and SLBM deployment	Soviets keep building ICBMs, SLBMs

A. Comparison of U.S.-Soviet strategic force postures over 20 years: Unilateral restraint versus steady buildup—Continued

	Soviet buildup
1967—Continued	
U.S. unilateral scale-down of ABM deployment plans	Soviet ABM program slightly cutback
1962–82:	
U.S. unilateral deactivates 364 B-52s	Soviets keep 190 Bear and Bison bombers throughout the period, produce Bear variants into the 1970s
1972:	
U.S. ABM program reduced from 12 sites possible, 4 authorized, 2 under construction, to only 1 site under construction	Soviets expand Moscow ABM in 1970s, and modernize
1973:	
U.S. ABM R&D cut drastically	ABM R&D increases after 1972, and continue at steady, active pace
1976:	
U.S. ABM site unilaterally deactivated	
1977–80:	
B–1 bomber unilaterally cancelled (240 aircraft cut)	Soviets mass-produce Backfire, 400 by 1985, three additional new bombers in advanced R&D
Initial operational capability unilaterally delayed four years for:	
MX ICBM (number of missiles and warheads also cut)	SS–19, SS–18, SS–17 fully deployed, five new ICBMs in advanced R. & D.
Trident submarine and SLBM (construction rate also cut)	Typhoon sub ahead of Trident, SS–N–8 operational since 1973
ALCM	New ALCMs, SLCMs in advanced R. & D.
GLCM	
SLCM	
ALCM unilaterally cancelled	
160 Polaris SLBMs unilaterally deactivated	Earliest Y, old G, and H retained
SRAM production unilaterally ended	AS–3, AS–4, and similar ASMs kept in inventory
400 Hound Dog ASMs unilaterally deactivated	
Minuteman III ICBM production line unilaterally dismantled	Over 4 ICBMs in mass production
Deployment of 100 Minuteman IIIs unilaterally cancelled	200 MIRVed ICBMs, 1000 warheads deployed per year since 1974, to continue through 1985
Mark 12A warhead proof-testing and deployment unilaterally delayed 3 years	
Underground nuclear weapons proof-testing and deployment unilaterally abandoned	Soviets test high yield warheads through 1970s
Minuteman II modernization unilaterally abandoned	
ABM R&D further reduced unilaterally	SS–13, SS–11 modernized
Further unilateral cutback in Patriot Air Defense missiles	Air defenses modernized
Proposed increases in Civil Defense rejected	Civil Defense steadily increases
ERW (neutron warhead) production unilaterally cancelled	Soviets already possess ERW
Lance I missile production unilaterally cancelled	Soviets deploy modernized FROGs, Scaleboard, SS–21, SS–22, SS–23
1,000 U.S. nuclear warheads unilaterally withdrawn from Europe	

A. Comparison of U.S.-Soviet strategic force postures over 20 years: Unilateral restraint versus steady buildup—Continued

	Soviet buildup
1977–80—Continued	
120 SLBMs on 5 delayed Trident submarines unilaterally cutback	Soviets increase warheads targeted on NATO four-fold
2,600 ALCMs cancelled on 130 B–52s	Soviets use 1,320 MIRV/ALCM launchers by 1985 as a goal, accelerate SLBM MIRV program in 1975
960 ALMCs cancelled by not maximizing B–52 ALCM loading	Soviets deploy long-range AS–6 on Backfire
5,000 ALCMs planned for B–1 cancelled	Soviets deploy long-range AS–6 on Backfire
1981–1985:	
Deployment of 100 stockpiled Minuteman III ICBMs again cancelled	
Unilateral reduction in MX ICBM deployment from 200 to 100, only 36 to 40 of which will actually be installed	Soviets have over 100 mobile SS–16 ICBMs stockpiled, ready for immediate deployment
Unilateral deactivation of 52 Titan II ICBMs, carrying 33% of existing ICBM megatonnage	
Cut-back of planned construction of one more Trident submarine	
Unilateral deactivation of 80 B–42Ds, carrying 19% of our bomber megatonnage	
Unilateral reduction of ALCM yearly production rate from 480 to 440 per year	Soviets mass producing ASMs, ALCMs

B. U.S. UNILATERAL RESTRAINT, 1961–62

	Delivery vehicles deactivated	Warheads lost
IRBM's	100	100
SLCM's	24	
GLCM's	100	100
B–47's	2,000	4,000
Atlas, Titan I	185	185
Titan II's	200	200
Minuteman	300	300
B–70's	200	400
Polaris	48	48
B–58	70	70
B 5	364	1,456
B–1	240	5,000
MX	200	2,800
6 delayed Trident subs	144	960
B–52 ALCM carrier reduction	130	2,600
ALCM A cancellation		1,000
SRAM cancellation		1,000
Hound Dog deactivation		400
Polaris deactivation	160	160
Minuteman III cancellation	100	300
Tactical warheads NATO, not maximizing ALCM's on		1,000
B–52		960
MX further reduction	150	1,500
Titan II deactivation	52	52
Cut 1 Trident sub	24	192
B–52 D's	80	320
Total	4,871	25,103

In conclusion, pursuit of a successful "build-down" proposal at the START negotiations will be seriously undermined if the United States unilateral "build-down" which is already underway is allowed to continue. I strongly urge that these unilateral actions be suspended, so that our negotiators in Geneva will be able to bargain from a position of strength.

In recent months, the United States has almost completed the unilateral deactivation of 292 strategic missiles and bombers counted in the SALT II Treaty, including Polaris SLBMs, Titan II ICBMs, and B–52D bombers. These forces carried over 500 nuclear warheads—or over one third of existing U.S. nuclear megatonnage. Although these forces were not the most modern weapons in our inventory, their gratuitous deactivation has precluded the chance to demand a quid pro quo from the Soviets at the START negotiations.

In addition to this unilateral deactivation, the Administration's strategic modernization program has also been cut back unilaterally by at least 46 percent, mostly because of MX and B–1B bomber reductions.

Moreover, the Administration has announced plans to deactivate unilaterally 90 B–52G bombers which are also among the forces which we have told the Soviets that we count within the levels of SALT II. In addition, I understand that there are plans to deactivate unilaterally two Poseidon submarines carrying 32 SLBMs in order to continue compliance with the expired SALT I Interim Offensive Weapons agreement.

This program of unilateral deactivation by the United States surely lifts the burden from the Soviets, relieving them of the pressure to submit to equal restraint. The Soviet incentive to consumate a START "build-down" treaty must surely diminish when the Soviets can just sit back and keep building up their forces, while watching the United States unilaterally disarm even before protracted negotiations get started.

Thus the U.S. unilateral deactivation undercuts the Administration's instructions to our negotiators at Geneva to obtain a "build-down" START agreement, since the Soviets perceive that the U.S. has already guaranteed a "build-down" without any concessions from their side. At the very least, we ought to maintain our oldest forces, if only to exchange them for new forces under START.

The U.S. unilateral deactivation is particularly disturbing in the light of the Soviet record of violations of the SALT treaties. We are informed that even Dr. Henry Kissinger, the chief architect of detente and SALT, is saying that the Soviets are massively cheating on SALT. Why should we deactivate under SALT when the Soviet violations are so flagrant? The Senate has unanimously voted to request that President Reagan urgently report openly to the Senate with regard to the Soviet SALT violations, about which he has re-

cently expressed your own serious concern to the United Nations. Without such a report, it will be hard to support the consensus necessary to ratify a START or INF treaty.

Accordingly, I believe that the following actions should be taken by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

1. We should request that the President send to the Senate as soon as possible a study of how the U.S. unilateral deactivations contribute to our derogate from our START build-down negotiating leverage.

2. We should request that the President expedite the urgently needed, public report to the Senate on Soviet SALT violations, since he has already addressed the United Nations on this subject several times.

3. We should request that the President send to the Senate a review of the contributions that the SALT I ABM treaty makes to our national security, in view of the mounting evidence of Soviet break out from the ABM treaty in order to establish a prohibited nationwide ABM defense.

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

The Committee voted 8–6 to substitute a new Section 5 for the build-down resolution. I suggested to the Committee that it was inappropriate in the present international situation with regard to testing. The test of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty which was negotiated in 1974 and informally put into effect in 1976 by the supposed mutual consent of the United States and the Soviet Union has become utterly meaningless as a result of the Soviet Union's actions.

The Soviet Union has conducted fifteen tests above the 150 kiloton threshold provided by the draft treaty. (See attached analysis and chart on Soviet TTBT violations.) It is a settled principle of international law that nations should adhere to negotiated principles of treaties until those treaties are ratified as a sign of good will. It is clear that the compliance measures of the treaty are totally inadequate. For the Senate to take up the treaty now would be a serious setback for arms control; ratification debate itself would be a sign that the U.S. condoned Soviet violations of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

The Administration is seeking to negotiate procedures to assure Soviet compliance with the Treaty. President Reagan stated at a press conference on March 29, 1983, in a reference to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty: ". . . we have reason to believe that there have been numerous violations . . ." of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. Moreover, former AGDA Director Eugene Rostow testified on July 29, 1982: ". . . We have real concerns about a number of tests conducted by the Soviets since the TTBT and PNET agreements were signed." Defense Secretary Weinberger stated on August 11, 1982 that some Soviet tests have been big enough "to raise serious questions about compliance" with the 150 kiloton threshold of the TTBT.

On July 20, 1982, a Senior White House official stated to the press:

> On several occasions, seismic signals from the Soviet Union have been of a sufficient magnitude to call into question Soviet compliance with the threshold of 150 kilotons.

I therefore proposed the following language to replace Section 5:

> The United States will seek to negotiate procedures to assure Soviet compliance procedures with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty limit of 150 kilotons on underground nuclear testing.

As noted, this amendment was approved by the Committee by a vote of 8 to 6.

The following unclassified analysis and chart on Soviet violations of the TTBT is offered here to backup the statements above by President Reagan, ACDA Director Rostow, Defense Secretary Weinberger, and the senior White House official. Moreover, the following analysis and chart was the principal argument I used to support my successful amendment.

SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

The attached Defense Department chart and analysis clearly indicate that the Soviet Union is flagrantly violating the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) limit of 150 kilotons put into effect in March of 1976. Both the chart and analysis are unclassified, according to the Defense Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

There have been 14 Soviet underground nuclear weapons tests since 1978 which are estimated to be above the 150-kiloton limit. There is 95 percent confidence that several tests have been above 250 kilotons or more.

In addition, Secretary of State Shultz has testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that during the week of June 16, the Soviet Union tested another nuclear weapon about "double" the 150-kiloton limit—approximately 300 kilotons.

The Defense Department chart indicates that since 1978, the Soviet Union has conducted at least five tests at the 300-kiloton level or higher—a factor of twice that allowed by TTBT.

The U.S. has given the Soviet Union the benefit of every doubt in TTBT compliance, even going so far as to change our methodology more than two times in the Soviets' favor. Nevertheless, the Soviets continue to violate TTBT.

The vertical axis of the chart is labeled "The Sliding Rulers," showing how the U.S. has changed its methodology twice. The horizontal bars represent the 150-kiloton thresholds, expressed in terms of the Richter Scale.

The lowest bar represents the 150-kiloton threshold for U.S. underground nuclear tests at the Nevada test site. The upper two bars represent Soviet 150-kiloton thresholds, as revised upwards by the U.S. to the benefit of the Soviets.

Each dot on the chart represents a Soviet test of a nuclear weapon at the Shagan River Test Area. For instance, the chart indicates the results of three nuclear tests at the site in 1976.

SOVIET NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
(SHAGAN RIVER TEST AREA)
GLOBAL MAGNITUDES (N.E.I.S.) VS TIME



Note: If the Soviets were testing up to the 150 KT limit of the TTBT in the first three years of the Treaty (as would be expected - the US certainly did), the Soviets are now testing up to 300 KT. Alternatively, if they are testing below 150 KT now, they must have restricted testing to below 75 KT during the first 2-1/2 years. This is an unrealistic assumption.

25-3

JESSE HELMS.

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